• There is an urgent need for the telecoms industry to protect itself 
• Cryptographically relevant quantum computers will be able to break today’s public key encryption systems in minutes
• New post-quantum cryptography (PQC), ‘crypto-agile’, attack-resistant algorithms are already available and others are under development
• New 5G Americas whitepaper suggests key recommendations for network operators

With the quantum computing era getting ever closer, industry body 5G Americas has just published a new whitepaper, Post Quantum Computing Security, which examines the urgent need for the telecom sector to prepare itself for the challenges that mobile network operators will face as the number and range of threats to network integrity multiply as quantum computers become commercially available.  

Factoring massive numbers on even the most advanced of today’s “classical” supercomputers requires so much power and dedicated resources that it would take even the most sophisticated teams of hackers hundreds of lifetimes to crack system security. However, it is known (and has indeed been shown) that a quantum computer powerful enough to be designated as a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) can easily break traditional public key encryption in a matter of minutes. That capability is courtesy of Shor’s Algorithm, a quantum algorithm for finding prime numbers of an integer – that is to say whole numbers that can be positive, negative or zero but do not have fractions or decimals. The algorithm was developed in 1994 at Bell Labs in New Jersey by the US mathematician Peter Shor: His brainchild runs particularly efficiently and effectively on quantum computers.

It is believed that the actual, rather than potential, capability to break today’s public key encryption may still be years away – some estimate it could happen by the turn of this decade while others opine that it will take until the mid- to late 2030s to materialise. Fortunately, research into ways to mitigate threats to telecom networks and the internet are well in hand and the threat that a CRQC would pose to traditional public key encryption, on which mobile networks and the public internet greatly rely for their security, has been recognised and is well understood.

Thus, new post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms resistant to attacks on both classical computing systems and CRQCs are now available. Back in 2016, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched a global programme to encourage and evaluate the quality and resilience of PQC algorithms and, as TelecomTV reported at the time, the first three PQC algorithms – as follows – were standardised in August of 2024.  

Those algorithms – the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) for secure key exchange, the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for authentication, and the Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH-DSA) for digital signatures​ – are designed to repel cyberattacks from both classical and quantum computers to ensure long-term security for all digital communications. 

That said, the transition to PQC is not an easy or straightforward process and it requires careful planning to integrate the new cryptographic methods into existing network architectures. There is also the matter of ensuring backward compatibility with extant infrastructure. That problem is only partially resolved. 

It is further accepted that the transition to quantum computing will also involve extra costs as a hybrid migration path able to accommodate a combination of traditional cryptography with quantum resistant abilities to bolster security overall is developed. PQC algorithms require bigger key sizes and extra computing resources to manage them, and that will mean major upgrades to existing systems in addition to the continuing heavy expense of the development of quantum computers themselves. Furthermore, rigorous performance testing will be absolutely essential to ensure potential interoperability capabilities.

Hybrid mechanisms combining traditional cryptography with PQC are also being developed to ensure that if one particular method is compromised, others remain operationally safe. For example, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) are actively working to define hybrid key exchange protocols and update security standards, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Internet Protocol Security (IPSec)​.

 “Harvest-now, decrypt-later” attacks already taking place

The 5G Americas whitepaper warns that hackers have, for some years now, been conducting so-called harvest-now, decrypt-later attacks, whereby encrypted data is intercepted and archived and kept ready to decrypt as soon as quantum computers are robust enough to take on the task.

It also emphasises the need to prepare for future quantum threats now and lists three key recommendations for immediate attention; the creation of cryptographic inventories and the assessment of system and network vulnerabilities; engagement with vendors to align quantum security migration strategies; and collaboration with industry bodies, such as the GSMA’s Post-Quantum Telco Network Taskforce for best practices and policy guidance. 

As far as wireless networks and the internet are concerned, quantum computing has the potential to greatly increase their security, efficiency and performance, notes 5G Americas president Viet Nguyen in this blog. In addition to quantum key distribution (QKD), which is set to be widely used to create unbreakable encryption, quantum algorithms can optimise network routing, reduce latency and improve bandwidth allocation, according to Nguyen, “which is crucial for handling the massive data demands of future networks like 6G. Additionally, quantum computing accelerates data processing and real-time analytics, enabling faster decision-making and improved traffic management in wireless systems. These advancements collectively promise more secure, efficient, and robust wireless networks,” adds the 5G Americas president. 

Meanwhile, NIST continues to evaluate a range of different PQC algorithms built on alternative mathematical models. If they pass muster, they will be added to the NIST list of approved new standard algorithms that will be pressed into service should any of the current set prove to be vulnerable at a later date. The institute is also examining ways to make new standard algorithms “crypto agile” – imbued with the capability of quickly and easily being switched into quantum systems to replace those found to have weaknesses.

The immediate replacement of traditional public key cryptography with PQC is an extremely complex task and will, perforce, be a phased process, hence the adoption of a hybrid migration route whereby security is established via both traditional public key and PQC algorithms with one solution acting as a shield should the other be compromised.

Nguyen adds: “Quantum computing represents both a transformative opportunity and a significant challenge for telecommunications security. By using hybrid approaches and adopting cryptographic agility, we can secure our networks against emerging quantum threats. The proactive work of standards bodies like IETF and 3GPP ensures the industry remains prepared for this evolution.”

Meanwhile, at the beginning of March, the GSMA’s Mobile World Congress 2025 will be held in Barcelona. Last year, Thierry Breton, then the European Union’s Commissioner for the Internal Market, announced the bloc’s PQC strategy would be made public “soon”. Twelve months on, little has happened and the future is less certain. 

Whereas only a few weeks ago European adoption of, and reliance on, NIST’s standardised algorithms would have been a foregone conclusion, some members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are now saying it is time for Europe to develop its own PQC algorithms. Austria and Germany have a long history of expertise in cryptography, as do non-EU members Switzerland and, particularly, the UK. A Europe-wide initiative where the continent would go its own way in a post-quantum world is no longer unthinkable. We live in strange and fractious times.

– Martyn Warwick, Editor in Chief, TelecomTV